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Abstract
This study examines the preventive measures that can be taken by the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) in 
their capacity as an SRO in response to capital market infractions. The main role of IDX is as a provider 
of facilities and infrastructure in capital market activities. Nonetheless, as a self- regulatory organization 
(SRO) IDX has additional role as regulator of the capital markets with limited authority. This study 
found that IDX was quite consistent in upholding the legislation in the field of capital markets. However, 
compliance level of the exchange members is still quite low. 
Keywords: SRO, IDX, capital market, compliance.
Intisari
Penelitian ini meneliti langkah-langkah pencegahan pelanggaran dan kejahatan pasar modal yang dapat 
diambil oleh BEI dalam kapasitasnya sebagai SRO. Peran utama BEI adalah sebagai penyedia sarana 
dan prasarana dalam kegiatan kepasarmodalan. Meskipun demikian, sebagai self-regulatory organization 
(SRO) BEI mempunyai peran tambahan sebagai regulator pasar modal dengan kewenangan terbatas dalam 
menetapkan peraturan. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa BEI telah cukup konsisten dalam menegakkan 
peraturan perundang-undangan di bidang pasar modal. Akan tetapi tingkat kepatuhan anggota bursa dapat 
dikatakan masih cukup rendah. 
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A. Background
In exercising its function as the administrator 
of the Indonesian capital market, the main role 
of the Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX ) is as a 
facilitator or provider of facilities and infrastructure 
(Article 7 paragraph (1) of UUPM1). Even so, as 
a self-regulatory organization (SRO), IDX plays 
an additional role as the regulator of the capital 
market with a limited authority in promulgating 
regulations. The legal basis for this role is Article 
9 paragraph 1 of UUPM. Presently, the role of the 
regulator is in support of IDX’s role as facilitator; 
in fulfilling its role as facilitator, IDX requires the 
authority of promulgating rules to organize systems 
and facilities for the purposes of organizing trade 
that is orderly, fair and efficient. 
The concept of a self-regulatory organization 
may prove useful to complete the role of the 
regulator in achieving the aims of capital market 
regulation,2 encouraging the creation of a more 
efficient trading market, and further increase public 
access to the capital market, which in turn will 
improve the economy.3 The rationale behind the 
self-regulatory authority is in reality simple: the 
regulatory body would be better equipped to create 
effective and useful capital market regulations if 
it has comprehensive and real-time knowledge on 
capital market activities taking place on the trading 
floor. A regulator whose daily activity centers on the 
market has an attachment with the capital market 
system as to enable them to promulgate regulations 
which are accountable and compatible with market 
needs. In short, the self-regulation concept is 
supported by the idea that an efficient regulatory 
setting can be attained by creating a combination 
of the knowledge of a trader which the securities 
exchange has, with the supervisory capabilities of 
the government (in Indonesia: Bapepam-LK, now 
OJK).4 Furthermore, the factor of proximity also 
eliminates the “us versus them” mentality which 
may hamper synergy.5 As the ones creating the rules 
of securities exchange are also those who organize 
stock exchange activities, the SRO concept 
eliminates sectoral sentiments which potentially 
create regulatory delays.
From the aforementioned description, it 
is clear that the concept of self-regulation rests 
upon the unique symbiotic mutualism relationship 
between private needs and public needs, which is 
driven by the desire to attain an efficient regulatory 
regime.6 This symbiosis is realized through healthy 
and efficient regulation for the complex, dynamic 
and ever-changing capital market industry. 
However, on the other hand, lays a weakness 
inherent in SROs. Several scholars employ 
the analogy of a fox guiding the chicken coop7 
namely that this concept is an oxymoron,8 with the 
fundamental weakness of conflict of interests. An 
SRO plays the dual-role as the organizer of capital 
market and as its regulator. This dual nature gives 
1 Law Number 8 of 1995 on Capital Market (State Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia Number 64 of 1995, Supplement to State Gazette of the 
Republic of Indonesia Number 3608). 
2 IOSCO Public Document No. 110, Model for Effective Self-Regulation, IOSCO SRO Consultative Committee (Mei 2000), p. 1. 
 According to IOSCO, self-regulation is an important part in the framework of ca pital market regulation. Its importance is such that the 
implementation of SROs is made as recommendation to countries developing their capital markets. This concept is used as a sort of strategy 
aiming to improve regulatory effectiveness and capital market integrity. IOSCO states that the concept of SROs is useful in improving the 
capacity to regulate and encourage compliance of securities exchange members with existing regulations. 
3 John Carson, 2011, Self-Regulation in Securities Markets, Policy Research Working Paper, Securities Market Group Global Capital Market 
Department Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency, World Bank, New York, p. 54.
4 Michael Deshmukh, “Is FINRA a State Actor? A Question that Exposes the Flaws of the State Action Doctrine and Suggests a Way to Redeem 
It”, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 4, April 2014, p. 1189.
5 See the testimony of John A. Thain (CEO, NYSE Group, Inc.) before the US Senate: A Review of Self-Regulatory Organizations in the 
Securities Markets: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs., 109th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9th March 2006, p. 5.
6 In several States, the formation of SROs is further driven by limitations of the resources of government authority. In the United States of 
America, for example, self-regulation is viewed as the proper solution to the issue of regulator’s expertise, the issue of conflicting interest 
between the regulator and capital market organizer, the issue of limitation of the government authority (in this sense, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission), and the issue of complexity of business transactions which would be difficult to regulate in detail by the law.
7 See for example, Cary Coglianese et al., 2004, The Role of Government in Corporate Governance, Regulatory Policy Program Report RPP-
08, Harvard University, Cambridge, p. 5. 
8  Steven Irwin et al., “Self-Regulation of the American Retail Securities Market – An Oxymoron for What is Best for Investors?”, University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2014, p. 1055.
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rise to the potential for conflict of interests, as a 
securities exchange has two polarized functions: the 
function of serving the needs of its members as well 
as users of the securities exchange, and the function 
of supervising activities on the trading floor.9 
Several steps have been taken in order to prevent 
the manifestation of this potential for conflict of 
interests. One of the most important measures is 
the establishment of the authority of Bapepam-LK 
(now OJK) to inspect and approve of the suggestion 
of regulations from IDX. This provision does 
invade upon the authority of IDX, but it is highly 
important in order to ensure the conceptual integrity 
of an SRO. 
In the context of its authority as organizers 
and regulators of the securities exchange, IDX 
holds a unique position in meeting its statutory aims 
of organizing a trading market for securities that is 
orderly, fair and efficient. The IDX is demanded to 
accommodate two interests which often contradict: 
the needs of a member of a securities exchange to 
increase trading volumes and the public interest 
of preserving the orderliness of stock exchange. 
Hence, the structure of an SRO must be maintained 
to an extent as to prevent conflicts of interests, so 
that the function of the regulator is not burdened or 
influenced by pressures of business interests.
From the following background, it would 
be interesting to examine how IDX’s performance 
as an SRO in preventing capital market violations 
and crimes in order  to create an orderly, fair and 
efficient capital market? Several important points 
discussed in this paper are inter alia the dual-role 
of IDX as the organizer and regulator of the capital 
market pursuant to UUPM and other regulations 
on capital market as well as the implementation of 
preventive and inspecting instruments applied by 
IDX. 
B. Research Method
This research employs a judicial normative 
and empirical method. As a judicial normative 
reseach, the reseacher conducted desk studies to 
examine the judicial basis for regulations on the 
role of IDX as an SRO in the capital market. This 
research is also empirical in nature, being based 
on primary and secondary data. Primary data was 
obtained through focus group discussions and 
continued with in depth interviews with stakeholders 
in the field of Indonesian capital market, namely PT 
BEI, OJK and issuers, as well as contributions from 
assisting researchers. Secondary data was obtained 
from PT BEI and OJK. Furthermore, the form of 
contribution of assisting researchers from PT BEI is 
made in the form of inputs and analysis, as well as 
support in the form of relevant data in answering the 
issues raised in this research. 
The data required in the formulation of this 
research are inter alia:
1) The form, type and incidents of capital 
market violations and crimes;
2) Regulations issued by IDX to exercise 
its legal function in affording protection 
to investors, law enforcement and 
preventing capital market violations 
and crimes; and
3) The form of law enforcement against 
capital market violations and crimes in 
Indonesia. 
In accordance with the spescific aim of the 
research, the location for this research is PT Bursa 
Saham Indonesia (Indonesian Stock Exchange) 
as an organizer which also implements a limited 
regulatory authority in the field  of capital market. 
The research and data collection were conducted 
through focus group discussion (FGD) involving 
OJK as a regulator in the field of capital market in 
Indonesia. 
9 SEC Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240 (8th March 2005).
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C. Research Result and Discussion
1. Primer on the Form of Self-Regulatory 
Organization and Their Impact on 
the Effort to Prevent Capital Market 
Violations and Crimes
The discussion of the capability of the capital 
market to prevent violations and crimes in the field 
of capital market would not be complete without 
the discussion of the conflict of interest created as a 
result of the SRO form. A stock exchange would not 
be able to operate without investor trust. Investors 
are inclined to only be willing to trade in a securities 
exchange that they have trust is (for example, due 
to reasons of security, personal preference over 
the companies listed on the exchange, or a more 
lax rules of conduct compared to other stock 
exchanges). The same also applies to the securities 
exchange members. As a result, a stock exchange 
which fails to accommodate the needs of the 
investing public and the needs of its members will 
slowly be abandoned. This shows that securities 
exchanges more or less depend upon the obligation 
to ensure that both its members and investors are 
constantly content. 
However, on the other hand, this obligation 
of investor protection calls into question the 
ability of the securities exchange in ensuring that 
trading activities on the trading floor are conducted 
transparently, efficiently and in an orderly manner. 
Would the securities exchange still be able to issue 
securities exchange regulations which are fair and 
not partial to investors (reflect favouritism)? In 
other words, a securities exchange must conduct 
measures to prevent violations and crimes in the 
field of capital market without being adversely 
affected by its close relationship with the investing 
public and securities exchange members. Only with 
this policy of impartiality of securities exchange can 
we hope to attain a capital market that is orderly, 
fair and efficient consistent with the mandate of the 
UUPM.
a. The Advantages and Disadvantages 
of Self­regulation
The research results show that self-
regulation has proven to be an efficient means 
of regulation. The flexible nature of SROs 
enable them to adapt to rapidly changing 
business environments. Self-regulation is 
further proven to be an efficient means of 
regulation. The regulations are formulized 
by the market makers having intensive 
knowledge on the market, who know how to 
maximize the benefits of the regulations (inter 
alia, an orderly market, consumer protection, 
the reduction of systemic risks) and 
minimizing business expenses. An in-depth 
Image 2. The Research Process Prepared by Researchers
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knowledge on the market is highly important 
to create a self-regulatory framework which 
would be perceived as appropriate and fair 
by the individuals regulated and entities. 
This perception will in turn effectuate a high 
degree of compliance by market makers 
operating the self-regulatory framework. 
Although having great benefits, 
self-regulation also comes with several 
disadvantages, which are inter alia self-
interest, poor adequate law enforcement, the 
tendency to monopolize and favoritism.10 
These weaknesses commonly stem from 
doubts as to how an SRO can protect the 
public interest without resulting in financial 
losses. Self-regulation even creates the 
concern that it could grant benefits for 
uncompetitive market makers. Through the 
SRO mechanism, its members and every 
involved SRO would be enabled to create an 
understanding to regulate and to implement 
certain behaviors and business patterns. In an 
industry, all other factors notwithstanding, if 
another member as well as competitor holds 
the same power to approve and enact such an 
understanding, no competition will further be 
had.
Another issue raised by self-regulation 
is favoritism. Self-regulation is implemented 
by SROs, who are very likely to be dominated 
by major or stable companies. The regulatory 
policies created could be beneficial to their 
interests only, rather than that of other 
members or that of the public interest.11
The aforementioned advantages and 
disadvantages of the SRO concept can be 
described using the following matrix:12
10 Angela J. Campbell, “Self-Regulation and the Media”, Federal Communication Law Journal, Vol. 51, 1999, p. 711.
11 Nguyen Tri Anh Van, 2004, Toward a Well Functioning Securities Market in Vietnam, Center for Asian Legal Exchange, School of Law 
Nagoya University, Nagoya, p. 136.
12 Excerpted from Cary Coglianese et al., 2004, Op.cit., pp. 7-8.
Table 1. Advantages and Disadvantages of the SRO Concept
Advantage Disadvantage
Proximity. SROs have the advantage of proximity 
with the supervised activity. SROs tend to receive 
up-to-date information faster, which enable it to 
immediately respond to important recent events. 
Furthermore, SROs have more capital market 
experts than the government.
Conflict	of	Interests. Even though SROs have 
more experts than the government, this does not 
necessarily mean that SROs will not prioritize its 
own interest over that of the public, which may 
alter the aim of a regulatory setting to that of a 
private aim instead of public. 
Flexibility. As the SRO is not a governmental 
institution, SROs tend to be free from political 
influence and the obligation to adhere to procedures 
which tend to be rigid. 
Half­Hearted Sanctions. Given its flexible 
governance model, there is the possibility that 
SROs may only issue light sanctions for severe 
violations. 
Compliance. Their involvement in promulgating 
regulations can be a persuasive element for market 
makers to adhere to the regulations of the securities 
exchange. Additionally, there is the perspective that 
creating SROs can resolve issues in the securities 
exchange in an elegant manner and in a manner 
consistent with the interests of the market makers. 
Poor Law Enforcement. When the capital 
market industry is at odds with public interests, 
SROs may be tempted to not enforce the law 
optimally. 
Common interest. Self-regulation can be seen as 
an opportunity to create a participatory compliance 
climate, where market makers can supervise one 
another. 
Global Competition. In the global market, inter 
State differences can create certain discrepancies. 
For example, SROs in State A tend to be more 
aggressive in self-regulating, while SROs in State 
B are more lax.
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b. The Process of Creating Securities 
Exchange Regulations and OJK 
Approval 
The internal regulations of IDX 
prescribe the dissemination of a drafted 
regulation throughout the creation process. 
Public testing must be conducted to gauge 
the reaction of market makers prior to the 
regulations’ ratification. The involvement 
of stockholders by IDX in this process 
usually last for a duration of two weeks. 
In this process, the IDX not only provides 
hardcopies but also softcopies of the 
regulation. The stockholders are invited and 
given an explanation on the intention of PT 
BEI to issue a new regulation as well as the 
scope of matters covered. During this phase 
the stockholders can directly give feedback 
on the drafted regulation. 
The involvement of stockholders 
from the earliest stage of rule-making 
should render the stockholders compliant to 
such rules. There should be no reason for 
non-compliance, bearing in mind that the 
stockholders are enabled to participate in the 
determination of regulations, and that they 
have agreed to the new regulation.13 After this 
process is completed, PT BEI requires the 
approval of OJK in ratifying the regulation. 
The approval of OJK is a mandatory 
requirement in the process of making rules.14 
If the approval of the OJK is not obtained, 
then the regulation may not be enacted.15 
The approval of OJK is a crucial 
component in ensuring the conceptual 
integrity of an SRO, as OJK’s approval acts 
as a check point to assist in supervising the 
conduct ot the SRO.16 Through the approval 
of OJK, the effects of conflicts of interest can 
be reduced. However, it must nonetheless 
be born in mind that one of the greatest 
challenges faced by the government in 
planning and managing the framework of law 
supervision is to exercise the proper degree of 
governmental supervision of SRO activities 
without reducing the ability of the SRO to 
respond in a quick manner and to be flexible 
in facing changes in market conditions and 
business needs.
The issue of delay in approving the 
drafts of securities exchange regulations 
has become a serious problem in the United 
States of America.17 Regulations issued by 
SROs (for example NYSE and NASDAQ) 
need to obtain the approval of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to 
being implementable. However, this policy 
of layered approval is not favored by several 
SROs given the lengthy time required by the 
SEC in evaluating the SRO regulation drafts. 
Given the high intensity of the competition 
climate in the US, this SEC delay reflects 
negatively upon the competitiveness of the 
securities exchange. 
Self­funding. As the funding of SROs originates 
from within themselves, SROs are immune from 
the effects of money politics and from the treat of 
external financing cuts. 
Financing Limitation. Being self-funding, 
SROs are susceptible to financing shortfalls and 
difficulties in obtaining additional funds due to 
conflict of interests.
13 Focus Group Discussion II (FGD II), Nindyo Pramono, Professor of the Faculty of Law, UGM, on 15th November 2013.
14 See Bapepam Regulation III.A.2. jo. the Decision of the Head of Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal Number Kep-03/PM/1996 on the Procedure 
of Promulgating Regulations by the Securities Exchange. 
15  Focus Group Discussion I (FGD I), Dewi Arum Prasetyaningtyas, Head of the Legal Division of PT BEI, on 23rd Augusts 2013.
16 The importance of governmental authority as a form of SRO supervision is further affirmed in the United States of America: “The Commission’s 
oversight function has two aspects: [...] and a negative responsibility of assuring that delegated power is not exercised in a manner inimical to 
the public interest or unfair to private interests”. Report of the US Senate No. 75 (94th Cong., 1st Sess., 1975), p. 34.
17 Jonathan G. Katz, 2009, Examining the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Washington D.C., p. 41.
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Although Indonesia only has one 
securities exchange dominating the market, 
the issue of competitiveness is nonetheless 
a valid point to question. Is the deadline 
of 60 days to approve/reject the securities 
exchange regulation too long as to reduce 
the competitiveness of the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange? 
The sources mentioned that in its 
practical manner, the application of Rule 
III.A.2 does not have a particular standard on 
how long it takes for a securities exchange 
regulation to finally take place. Most of the 
securities exchange regulations proposed to 
OJK would highly likely be approved. In the 
case that such regulation is not approved, 
OJK will return it to the Securities Exchange 
for a revision which finally will also be 
approved by OJK.
Reviews made in 2007 (July-
September) do not indicate evaluations made 
on the  duration required by OJK (formerly 
Bapepam) in examining the regulation 
draft proposed by PT BEI.18 The principles 
employed as the framework of capital market 
regulation aims to protect investors, ensure 
fairness, efficiency and market transparency, 
as well as reduce systemic risk.
2. Instrument of Prevention of Violations 
and Crimes 
A model of instruments to prevent violations 
and crimes cannot be dismissive of the potential 
for conflict of interests. The following analysis 
of research results seeks to lay out the discussion 
of instruments of the prevention of violations and 
crimes in the context of conflicts of interest created 
as a direct result of the self-regulation concept.
Securities exchanges cannot operate without 
investor trusts. Investors tend to only be willing 
to conduct trade in securities exchanges that they 
have faith in. A securities exchange that is unable 
to protect the interest of the investor will slowly 
be abandoned. Hence, securities exchanges must 
ensure that trading activities on the trading floor 
proceed in a transparent, efficient and orderly 
manner, as well as a manner which ensures legal 
certainty. In other terms, securities exchanges 
must conduct measures to prevent capital market 
infractions which are further expected to create 
a capital market that is orderly, fair and efficient. 
The prevention of infractions can be conducted 
through preventive instruments targeting Issuers 
and Members of the securities exchange
a) Preventive Instruments Targeting 
Issuers 
Unusual Market Activity (UMA) 
refers to trading activities and/or change 
of price for Securities which are irregular 
in a defined time period in the securities 
exchange, which may potentially disrupt 
the establishment of Securities trade that is 
orderly, fair and efficient according to the 
securities exchange. The announcement of 
an UMA does not immediately show that 
there are violations of capital market laws 
and regulations. If a Securities is classified as 
an UMA, the investor is expected to take into 
account19  the answer of the listed company 
to the request for securities exchange 
confirmation; to scrutinize the performance 
of the listed company and the transparency of 
its information; reassess the corporate action 
plan of the listed company if the plan has 
yet received an approval from the GMS; and 
consider numerous possibilities which may 
arise in the future prior to deciding to invest. 
UMAs begun to be implemented in 
2008. Prior to 2008, IDX did not issue UMAs, 
but Letters of Investor Caution. This letter of 
caution holds the same function as the UMA. 
UMA is directed more to the investors than 
the issuers and is expected to provide an 
18 Bapepam-LK, 2007, Siaran Pers Akhir Tahun 2007, Bapepam-LK, Jakarta, pp. 21-22.
19  See for example: The Announcement of the Unusual Market Activity of PT SLJ Global Tbk. (SULI), 11th November 2013.
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early warning for investor to exercise greater 
caution. The occurrence of a UMA can be 
caused by numerous parties, namely by the 
members of the securities exchange, issuers, 
or the investors themselves.20
Following the enactment of UMAs, the 
securities exchange will issue a confirmation 
request to the issuer to discover the reason 
behind the price volatility. A caveat is that 
this request for confirmation is not always 
published by the securities exchange. This 
further explains the reason why, in 2009, 
information on UMAs were not published in 
annual reports.21 
Up until 2012 PT BEI has issued 
UMAs at least 317 times. These measures 
were enacted against at least 279 listed 
securities. In the event of a UMA and it is 
suspected that there are irregularities, the 
stock market authorities are entitled to 
suspend the securities. This suspension is 
not a penalty, but rather is a means to enable 
investors to cool down by giving them more 
time to gather information before making a 
decision to invest. Suspensions, as defined 
here, must not necessarily be implemented 
by the securities exchange. If the volatility 
of the securities price is due to an improved 
performance of the issuer which resulted 
in a greater surge of buying and selling, 
suspension would not be necessary.
Up until 2012, IDX has suspended 
securities at least 267 times. Suspensions 
were most often conducted in 2007, namely 
a total of 97 times. This suspension is 
enacted against at least 210 securities listed 
in the securities exchange. In the year 2007 
IDX conducted 97 suspensions against 72 
securities. For the following years, the number 
of suspensions averages to 30 suspensions 
per year. The following is a recapitulation of 
the UMA issued by IDX since 2008. 
20 Focus Group Discussion II (FGD II), Isharsaya, President Director of the Investor Protection Funds (IPF), on 15th November 2013.
21  Focus Group Discussion II (FGD II), Zakky Ghufron, Staff of Trade Division in of PT BEI, on 15th November 2013.
22 Ibid.
Table 2. Supervision and Imposition of Unusual Market Transaction (UMA)
Note: (-) refers to an absence of data in the IDX Yearly Report
Year Confirmation	
request
UMA on Suspension on Examination Forwarded to 
Bapepam
2007 116 times - - 97 times 72 Securities 56 incidents -
2008 211 times 65 times 60 Securities 40 times 39 Securities 33 incidents -
2009 - - - - - - -
2010 - 98 times 86 Securities 43 times 33 Securities 48 incidents 13 incidents
2011 - 72 times 62 Securities 35 times 34 Securities 40 incidents 27 incidents
2012 - 82 times 71 Securities 52 times 32 Securities - -
Total 327 times 317 times 279 Securities 267 times 210 Securities 117 incidents 40 incidents
After enacting suspensions, the 
securities exchange is authorized to conduct 
inspections. The report of this inspection shall 
be recommended to the OJK where there are 
strong indications of violations of capital 
market laws and regulations. The parameter 
for assigning the matter to OJK is based 
upon findings from documents, transaction 
patterns and the relation between investor 
and issuer or securities exchange member. 
Aside from formulating recommendations to 
the OJK, the trade division may also create 
recommendations to the membership division 
to implement sanctions.22 In terms of matters 
being assigned to the OJK, there were 13 
incidents in 2010 and 27 incidents in 2011.
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Full Disclosure another preven-
tive instrument against issuers is the 
implementation of full disclosure. According 
to Article 1 number 25 of UUPM, the principle 
of full disclosure is a general guideline which 
requires issuers, public companies and other 
parties to convey to the public all Material 
Information pertaining to their business or 
securities, which may have effect upon the 
decision of the investor on the securities or 
its price, in a timely manner.
The principle of full disclosure is also 
regulated under Article 86 paragraph 1 of 
UUPM. The Article stipulates that issuers 
whose registration statement has become 
effective, is obliged to:
1) Submit periodic report to OJK 
or Bapepam and make public 
such reports; and
2) Submit reports to Bapepam/OJK 
and make public information 
regarding material events 
which may affect the price of 
securities, no later than 2 (two) 
working days after the event.
The provision of Article 86 paragraph 
1 letter b of UUPM is further regulated 
under the Decision of the Board of Directors 
of PT Bursa Efek Jakarta (Jakarta Stock 
Exchange) Number: Kep. 306/BEJ/07/2004 
on Regulation Number I E on the Obligation 
to Submit Information. This regulation 
was enacted in order to increase protection 
of investors through provisions which 
can increase the quality of information 
transparency of listed companies. 
The full disclosure principle has 
several judicial characteristics, namely:23
1) The principle of degree of 
information accuracy, namely 
that the information provided by 
the Issuer must be accurate;
2) The principle of degree of 
information completeness, 
namely that Issuers must 
provide information as complete 
as possible on the condition of 
their company to the investor 
candicate who will invest in the 
company;
3) The principle of striking 
equilibrium between the 
negative and positive effects 
of the information being 
made public, namely that the 
law must seek out a point of 
equilibrium so as to minimize 
the sacrificing of the interest of 
the involved parties, namely by 
making provisions on aspects 
which must be made public and 
matters which the company may 
keep confidential.
Information is an important element for 
investors and traders as it inherently provides 
descriptions, annotations or illustrations both 
for past conditions and present. Information 
that is complete, relevant, accurate and 
timely is greatly required by investors in the 
capital market to be analyzed before deciding 
to invest. 
The Issuer must provide information 
required by the investor and OJK. The Issuer 
must take heed of certain matters which will 
be informed to the investor, and the Issuer 
is prohibited from providing information 
which is false, half-true, incomplete, or silent 
on material information. Information that is 
complete and adequate is the foundation for 
the formation of a fair market price. 
Bapepam Regulation X.K.1 on the 
Disclosure of Information which shall be 
Immediately Made Public prescribes that a 
public company or issuer must submit the 
existence of an information or material fact 
to Bapepam and public as soon as possible. 
The types of information which are predicted 
to have effect on the value of the securities 
are inter alia:
23 Munir Fuady, 1996, Hukum Bisnis dalam Teori dan Praktek, Citra Aditya Bakti, Bandung, p. 90.
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1) merger, purchase of shares, 
acquisition, or the formation of 
joint venture;
2) stock split and the division of 
stock dividens;
3) gains from dividends of an 
extraordinary nature; 
4) obtaining or losing important 
contracts;
5) meaningful new products or 
inventions;
6) changes in control or important 
changes in management; 
7) announcements of repurchase or 
payment of debt securities;
8) the sales of additional securities 
to the public or in a limited 
manner in a material quantity;
9) the purchase, or losses in selling 
assests which are material in 
nature; 
10) relatively important employment 
disputes;
11) important legal actions against 
the company, and/or the board 
of directors and the board of 
commissioners of the company
12) the submission of offer to 
purchase the securities of 
another company;
13) changes in the accountant 
auditing the company;
14) changes in trustee; and
15) changes in the company’s fiscal 
year.
b) Preventive Instruments Targeting 
Securities Exchange Members
Instruments of prevention of 
infractions are also implemented towards 
securities exchange members as well as to 
the issuers. Such preventive instruments take 
the form of audits on financial capability, 
compliance audits and incidental audits.
What is referred to as financial 
capability is the ability to adequately manage 
finances, as well as the fulfillment of the fit 
and proper criteria as prescribed under laws 
and regulations, fulfilling the requirement 
of authorized capital and paid-up capital 
which are implemented by the securities 
exchange in accordance with its provisions, 
and also having fulfilled financial obligations 
including registration fees, membership fees, 
compensation funds, monthly contributions, 
and other expenses determined by the 
securities exchange.
An audit on the securities exchange 
member can also be conducted through a 
reporting of the Adjusted Net Working Capital 
(ANWC). ANWC is the basis for securities 
exchange members to conduct transactions 
in the securities exchange. ANWC is based 
upon Bapepam Regulation No. 5 D.V on 
the Maintenance and Reporting of Adjusted 
Net Working Capital (ANWC). Pursuant to 
the regulation, what is defined as ANWC is 
the number of current assets of the securities 
company subtracted by the whole liability 
of the Securities Company and ranking 
liabilities, added with the subordinated debt, 
with several other adjustments being made.
Security exchange members are 
obliged to report on ANWC in certain 
time periods. Pursuant to number 4 item b, 
Bapepam Regulation No 6.D.V, securities 
companies are obliged to maintain ANWC 
every working day and submit ANWC 
reports in accordance with Form Number 
V.D.5-1, Form Number V.D.5-2, Form 
Number V.D.5-3, Form Number V.D.5-4, 
Form Number V.D.5-5, Form Number V.D.5-
6, Form Number V.D.5-7, Form Number 
V.D.5-8, Form Number V.D.5-9 and Form 
Number V.D.5-10.
Pursuant to the V.D.5 regulation, if 
there are securities exchange members who 
do not report and/or fail to meet the minimum 
ANWC value as prescribed under number 2 
letter b and letter f, the securities exchange 
is obliged to prohibit the securities exchange 
member from conducting securities exchange. 
Further, number 4 letter d stipulates that 
if the securities company of the securities 
exchange member fail to meet the minimum 
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ANWC value as prescribed under number 2 
letter b and letter f, the securities exchange 
must oblige the securities company of the 
securities exchange member to:
1) halt the opening of accounts by 
of new clients;
2) halt securities transaction which 
will cause an increase in the 
long position or short position 
in the portfolio of the securities 
company except in exercising or 
selling Pre-Emptive Rights;
3) halt securities transactions 
which would cause an increase 
in the debit balance or long 
position in the account of the 
client; 
4) halt securities transactions 
in the account of the client 
and exercising or selling Pre-
Emptive Rights if the ANWC 
deficit is over 20% (twenty 
percent) of the required ANWC 
value; and
5) convey plans to the securities 
exchange containing the 
schedule, method, and form of 
capital increase, reduction of 
business activities, or the halting 
of business activities as well as 
submitting a  courtesy copy to 
OJK. 
If the securities exchange member 
insufficiently or is late in reporting its 
ANWC, the securities exchange shall 
suspend the member. Following this, a team 
will be formed to examine the ANWC. 
The securities exchange is allowed to issue 
sanctions (such as in the form of suspensions) 
even when the inspection of the securities 
exchange member has not taken place. After 
the inspection, a revocation of the suspension 
may be conducted if the ANWC is positive. If 
there are infractions, the securities exchange 
member is lead back to compliance, and if 
necessary is given sanctions.24 
Compliance audit of the securities 
exchange members is the third preventive 
instruments of capital market infractions in 
Indonesia. The audit covers the completeness 
of the regulations of the securities exchange 
members as prescribed by capital market 
regulations, the inspection of the procedure 
of regulation execution in the operation of the 
securities exchange members, and inspection 
on the information system of the securities 
exchange members used for trade in IDX. 
Compliance audit targeted towards securities 
exchange members cover numerous laws and 
regulations in the field of capital market.
To effectuate compliance, IDX 
can employ the means of supervision by 
inspections. This inspection is divided 
into two namely general and specialized 
inspections. This is an issue which the 
researcher has mentioned in the discussion 
of the first issue. The focus of inspections 
is adjusted upon the events transpiring at 
the moment or on a flexible basis. If errors 
are found, IDX will issue a warning for the 
securities exchange member to rectify the 
error. Furthermore, with respect to securities 
exchange members in violation of law and 
regulations, guidance can be given as to 
attain compliance on capital market rules 
and regulation. Here, guidance is aimed to 
correct the errors of securities exchange 
members. The form of guidance rendered 
can be in summoning or to be referred to the 
membership division for sanctioning.25
The next preventive instrument is 
incidental audit. The incidental audit is 
regulated under Regulation of Securities 
Exchange Number III E on the inspection of 
Securities Exchange members. Pursuant to 
the regulation, inspection refers to a series 
of activities in searching, gathering and 
24 Focus Group Discussion II (FGD II), Kristian S. Manullang, Head of Membership Division of IDX, on 15th November 2013.
25 Focus Group Discussion II (FGD II), Lidya, Head of the Compliance Division of IDX, on 15th November 2013.
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processing data and/or other information 
by the securities exchange to prove and/
or indicate the existence of an infraction of 
securities exchange regulation as well as 
capital market laws and regulations. 
Incidental inspections are a form 
of supervision exercised by the securities 
exchange in organizing an orderly, fair and 
efficient trade in securities. This incidental 
inspection is conducted by the securities on, 
but not limited to, the following matters:
1) II.5.1. Inspection of the assets of 
Securities Exchange Members 
having been suspended;
2) II.5.2. Inspection of the 
existence of disputes or potential 
disputes between the Securities 
Exchange Members and the 
client or between Securities 
Exchange Members;
3) II.5.3. the result of monitoring 
related to the activities of the 
Securities Exchange Members;
4) II.5.4. Inspection of indications 
of transaction irregularities;
5) II.5.5. Inspection of Securities 
Exchange Members in failing to 
meet the minimum Adjusted Net 
Working Capital in accordance 
with the Bapepam Regulation 
and LK Number V.D.5 on the 
Maintenance and Reporting of 
Adjusted Net Working Capital; 
6) II.5.6. Inspection of the the 
refulfillment of the Adjusted 
Net Working Capital;
7) II.5.7. Inspection in the event 
of failure of payment by the 
Securtities Exchange Members;
8) II.5.8. Inspections of the security 
of Securities account should the 
Securities Exchange Member 
intend to terminate its activity as 
a Securities Exchange Member. 
This inspection can be conducted 
in the Securities Exchange or the location 
of the Securities Exchange Member, and 
is conducted by the Securities Exchange 
Inspector Task Force Unit (Satuan Pemeriksa 
Bursa) based on a Letter of Assignment 
from the Securities Exchange. Pursuant to 
regulation III E on the Inspection of Securities 
Exchange Members item III number 3, the 
result of the incidental inspections on material 
issues found are to be conveyed to the OJK, 
Board of Commissioners and the Board of 
Directors of the Securities Exchange.
3. Good Corporate Governance
Aside from the aforementioned instruments, 
PT BEI must also promote good corporate 
governance in preventing infractions. As previously 
mentioned, one of the characteristics of good 
corporate governance is the transparency of 
information. The public, primarily market makers, 
ideally should be able to access information in a 
fast and precise manner. This is highly important 
bearing in mind that the main tool by which an 
investor can formulate a decision is information. If 
a piece of information arrives late, or is incorrect, 
the investor stands to incur losses. From a broader 
perspective, the securities exchange may lose trust 
investor trust.
Pursuant to the public goods theory doctrine, 
securities exchanges as the organizers of securities 
trade are private legal entities in the form of limited 
liability companies (PT). PT BEI operates in a 
sector of services owned and closely supervised by 
the government. This means that PT BEI falls into 
the category of public goods. The consequence of 
this finding is that the public must be able to access 
the securities exchange.
The government has the authority to regulate 
with respect to public goods. However, this function 
was delegated to the OJK as the primary regulator 
and also to IDX through statutes (attribution). 
Both entities consequently replaced the role of the 
government in regulating the capital market. IDX, 
as facilitator, is obliged to ensure that the securities 
exchange be accessible and enjoyable by all layers 
of the society. One form of access which must be 
afforded to all layers of the society is information 
related to capital market. Information can be 
disseminated to the public through various media, 
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both printed and electronic.
PT BEI itself realizes the importance of 
information transparency by exercising good 
corporate governance. PT BEI has made the 
commitment to improve the governance and 
management of corporate risks in a continuous 
manner as to create a good capital market. In 
2012, PT BEI has consistently implemented 
Good Corporate Governance, including Good IT 
Governance.
Drawing from the experience of the New York 
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ Stock Market,26 
a vital issue is that on the independence and 
transparency of regulatory programs. Regulatory 
functions must be maintained to be separate from 
that of capital market organization to minimize 
the potential for conflict of interests. Although the 
function of an SRO is to reduce the gap between 
the regulated and the regulator (proximity aspect), 
the separation of the rule-making division must 
nonetheless be made as to avoid interference from 
the market.
Aside from the principle of good corporate 
governance, the implementation of IOSCO 
principles on self-regulation may also be a preventive 
mechanism against capital market infractions. The 
appropriate implementation of the IOSCO principle 
of SROs would provide added value.
However, if PT BEI is the sole entity 
implementing the principle of good corporate 
governance, without being followed by the 
securities exchange members, the concern is raised 
that the prevention of capital market violations 
and crimes will be less effective. A securities 
exchange member which is not transparent may 
potentially inflict losses upon clients or investors. 
Additionally, an inconsistent implementation of the 
good corporate governance principle by different 
members of the securities exchange must be made 
uniform through a minimum standard. Hence, 
a method must be devised to give incentive for 
members of the securities exchange to implement 
the good corporate governance principle to protect 
the interest of investors, and that of market makers 
as a whole. It is highly important for IDX to wield 
chief responsibility in supervising the compliance 
of securities exchange members to laws and 
regulations. One policy which may be considered is 
inter alia by obliging securities exchange members 
to apply a standard of good corporate governance 
that is at least equal to that applied by the SRO. 
This measure was taken by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, which realized that SRO 
played a crucial role as a standard setter for listed 
companies.27 
The potential for violations or infractions may 
be suppressed with the existence of good corporate 
governance in PT BEI and the securities exchange 
members. In the end, the trade in securities which is 
orderly, fair and efficient would be realized.
D. Conclusion
IDX and other SROs are expected to 
continuously maximize their function as SROs in 
preventing capital market violations and crimes in 
the midst of the tumultuous global situation. To this 
end, IDX must be able to preserve a positive capital 
market sentiment, so that investors may feel secure 
in investing. A negative global sentiment would 
surely affect investors, and the success of IDX 
in capital market law enforcement could enable 
investors to feel secure in trading in the Indonesian 
capital market.
The key element in successfully regulating 
capital market activities are prophylactic 
approaches or prevention through compliance. 
The enforcement of regulations through sanctions 
tend to be more costly than preventive measures. 
One policy which may be considered is by obliging 
securities exchange members to apply a good 
corporate governance standard that is at least equal 
to that applied by the SRO to ensure the quality of 
26 SEC Release (Proposed Rule), Release No. 34-50699, 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 242, and 249 (2005).
27 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
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governance. It would be unfortunate if IDX, as a 
facilitator, properly implements good corporate 
governance principles but this is not followed by the 
securities exchange members. The implementation 
of good corporate governance principles must be 
made uniform through the creation of a minimum 
standard.
As an SRO, IDX has been sufficiently 
consistent in implementing capital market laws 
and regulations. An indicator of this is the practice 
of sanctioning securities exchange members in 
violation of laws and regulations in a fair and 
transparent manner. However, the degree of 
compliance of securities exchange member can 
be deemed to be fairly low. This is demonstrated 
in the behaviors of several securities exchange 
member who engage in repeat violations in a 
relatively short period of time; indicating the 
inexistence of a deterrence effect which may be 
due to the tendency of traders to always calculate 
the risks of doing business. Infractions leading 
to sanctions are perceived as a normal and fairly 
low cost of doing business, as to not necessitate a 
follow-up through internal improvements. Even 
so, this conclusion cannot be interpreted as an urge 
to implement sanctions across the board without 
assessing merit. Even though criminal sanctions 
may render traders and corporations to think twice 
before committing infractions, the implementation 
of criminal sanctions can be unsuitable and create 
an unfavorable investing climate as the government 
will be perceived to be ruling with an iron fist. The 
appropriate measure is by utilizing civil sanctions as 
the main threat, and employing criminal sanctions 
only in a selective manner.
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